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namely, abuse of administrative discretion and informed consent
problems. In Knecht v. Gillman, the court of appeals had an oppor-
tunity to delineate the limits of tolerable conduct of those supervis-
ing the care and treatment of the mentally ill. It failed to do so.
True, the court did restrict the administration of a highly controver-
sial therapy to consenting inmates. But the court never set objective
standards for measuring the quality of inmate consent nor did it
establish adequate guidelines for judging the propriety of adminis-
trative treatment decisions, particularly as they effect fundamental
constitutional rights.
The difficulty with the Knecht decision lies in the court's failure
to examine thoroughly all the complexities and to impose restric-
tions which a more reasoned examination of the real world of mental
institutions would have required. In its best light, the Knecht deci-
sion represents a welcome attempt by a federal court to curb, at
least in flagrantly abusive situations, the therapeutic regimens
which mental health professionals can inflict upon their unwary
charges.
Louise Porac
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-
EVIDENCE-RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION-CROSS EXAMINATION-
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the right of
confrontation is denied when a juvenile cannot be cross-examined
concerning his probationary status by a defendant charged with the
same type of offense.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
The safe of the Polar Bar in Anchorage was stolen in the early
Brennan would strike down a practice as cruel and unusual punishment if: the punishment
is unusually severe; there is a strong possibility that it is inflicted arbitrarily; it is substan-
tially rejected by contemporary society; and there is no reason to believe that it serves a penal
purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment. Id. at 271-81.
Employing this standard, even the most liberal medical and psychiatric opinion regards
aversion therapy as an extreme form of treatment. Ample recorded evidence exists to indicate
ISMF officials administered the treatment arbitrarily and often without regard to individual
sensibilities. Expert testimony cast doubt on its remedial benefits. In more than one instance,
contemporary society has forced the cessation of aversion therapy experimentation. See
generally J. MITFORD, KIND AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
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hours of February 16, 1970 and later found along a road near An-
chorage. Richard Green, a juvenile on probation for burglary, told
state troopers that he had seen two men standing beside a car near
where the safe was found.' At the trial, Green was a crucial witness
for the prosecution, identifying Davis, the defendant, as one of the
men he had seen.' Prior to the taking of testimony, the prosecution
moved for a protective order to prevent any references to Green's
juvenile record; defendant opposed the order, maintaining that
Green's delinquency would be used only to show that, when aiding
the investigators, Green was on probation and, therefore, biased. 3
The trial court granted the protective order, relying on a juvenile
rule of procedure4 and a statute which barred the use of evidence of
the juvenile's adjudicated delinquency in subsequent proceedings
against the child in any court.5 Though limited by the protective
order, the defendant attempted to expose Green's state of mind at
the time he was being questioned on the scene by the investigators.
The defendant asked Green whether he had ever previously been
interrogated in that manner by the police; Green responded with a
curt "no." '
1. Joshaway Davis was arrested on February 18, and on the following day Green identified
Davis as one of the men he had seen and described to the police on the day before. Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 309-11 (1974).
2. Green testified that, while on an errand for his mother, he saw two men standing next
to a blue Chevrolet on a road near his home. He offered the men assistance, but they rejected
his offer. Returning from the errand, Green again passed the men, noticing that one of them
was holding "something like a crowbar." Green identified this man as Davis. Id. at 310.
3. On this basis, defense counsel wished to show that Green's fear of jeopardizing his
probationary status prejudiced his testimony. Recognizing the policy of shielding juveniles,
the defense stated that Green's record would be revealed only as necessary to expose the
possibility of bias. Id. at 311. For a discussion of bias as a form of impeachment see note 37
infra.
4; AL&sKA R. Juv. P. 23 provides:
No adjudication, order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a court
not acting in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing
procedure in a criminal case where the superior court, in its discretion, determines that
such use is appropriate.
5. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) provides:
No adjudication under this chapter upon the status of any child may operate to impose
any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction upon a criminal charge,
nor may a minor afterward be considered a criminal by the adjudication, nor may the
adjudication be afterward deemed a conviction, nor may a minor be charged with or
convicted of a crime in a court, except as provided in this chapter. The commitment
and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible against
the minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court . ...
Id. (emphasis added).
6. 415 U.S. at 312-13. The Court found this response by Green to be quite significant. It
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An immediate objection by the prosecutor was sustained, thereby
preventing further inquiry into Green's state of mind. The Alaska
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, stating that he
had adequate opportunity to probe Green's possible bias or motive.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the
question of whether Davis was denied his constitutional right to
adequately cross-examine Green.' The Court held that the cross-
examination permitted was not adequate.'
Two POLICIES IN CONFLICT
The issue raised by the case is whether the countervailing state
interest in protecting the record of a juvenile should provide an
exception to the right of confrontation when the record is revealed
to show the juvenile's possible bias. The case represents a conflict
between the state's legitimate policy of protecting juveniles and the
right of the accused to confront and challenge the witnesses who
testify against him.
The reformers who designed the juvenile court system"° thought
that the application of criminal penalties to juveniles was overly
harsh and sought to protect the child through the doctrine of parens
patriae." The primary purpose of the juvenile courts was not pun-
ishment but rehabilitation and crime prevention; 2 in theory, the
court was to treat youths guilty of criminal acts in non-criminal
ways. To this end various states establishing juvenile courts sought
to assure the confidentiality of the juvenile court record.13 Some
thirty-nine states have enacted legislation forbidding any subse-
is apparent that Green, having been found guilty of burglary in a juvenile proceeding, must
have undergone some form of similar questioning at that time. It can only be concluded that
Green must have been aware of the protective order. If not, he would have given the matter
some thought before responding, and would not have responded to the question with a curt
"no.-
7. Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025 (Alas. 1972).
8. Davis v. Alaska, 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
9. 415 U.S. at 315. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger; Justice
Stewart wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist joined in a dissent by Justice White.
10. The first juvenile court system was established in 1899. For accounts of the origin and
evolution of the juvenile court see Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile
Courts, 1 J. FAM. L. 151 (1961).
11. Comment, In Re Gault and the Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and
Legal Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 Naa. L. REv. 558 (1968).
12. Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 907-08 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
13. Cashman, Confidentiality of Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Review, 24 JUVENILE
JUSTICE, Aug. 1973, at 30.
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quent use of the records of juvenile proceedings against the minor
"in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court." 4 These
statutes seek to protect the juvenile from the use of his juvenile
record in subsequent criminal proceedings against him. 5 It was
under such a statute that the Alaska trial court issued the protective
order barring the disclosure of the adjudicated delinquency of
Green."
The right of confrontation has even more ancient roots. 7 Its devel-
opment has been gradual, evolving from early'English cases denying
the right," through the development of the hearsay rule, its counter-
part,'9 to its present recognition as a fundamental, 0 but not
absolute,"' right. It is essentially an evidentiary concept 2 designed
to increase the likelihood that the truth will emerge through testi-
14. For a list of these states see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196, at 212 (3d ed. Supp. 1970).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) and ALASKA R. Juv. P. 23 are typical.
15. See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 443 (1943).
16. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971); ALASKA R. Juv. P. 23.
17. Traces of the right of confrontation are found in the Bible. When the elders gave the
prisoner, Paul, to Festus, asking him to render judgment, Festus said:
It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is
accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concern-
ing the crime laid against him.
Acts 15:16.
18. Until the mid-sixteenth century there was no objection to the use of testimonial
statements made by persons not in court. Over the next two centuries, a growing sense of
impropriety arose, resting in the belief that statements used as testimony should be made
only when the person against whom they were directed had the opportunity of probing their
trustworthiness by means of cross-examination. By the early eighteenth century, there was a
general acceptance of this rule as a fundamental part of the law. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1364 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
19. The history of the hearsay rule is traced in 30 ALsAY L. REV. 151, 152 (1966). See
also WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 1395.
20. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (confrontation and cross-examination
are fundamental rights to a fair trial).
21. The Court has long recognized exceptions to the general rule. See, e.g., Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (dying declarations admissible); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 244, 247-48, (1878) (testimony of a witness whose absence was due to the
procurement of the defendant admissible).
Although hearsay rules and the confrontation clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, the overlap is not complete. When evidence is admitted in violation of the
hearsay rule there is not an automatic violation of the confrontation clause. The confrontation
clause is not merely a codification of the hearsay rules as they existed at common law. See,
e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
For an analysis of the exceptions to the hearsay rule in light of the confrontation clause see
Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1965).
22. WIGMORE, supra note 18, §§ 1395-97.
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mony; cross-examination is the tool used to effectuate this right.23
Although the Supreme Court has infrequently reviewed a state
court decision on the right of confrontation,24 it has held that, in
given circumstances, restricting the scope of the defendant's cross-
examination may violate his right of confrontation .2
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
The Court rejected the Alaska Supreme Court's finding that the
scope of cross-examination permitted on the issue of bias was suffi-
cient.2 1 Although the trial court permitted some general questioning
on bias, the Court found the defendant was prevented from laying
the necessary foundation to show and argue why the witness might
have been biased. 21 Without this foundation, the jury may have
viewed the questions of counsel as merely speculative or harassing. 8
The Court stated that effective and adequate cross-examination is
a vital interest secured by the confrontation clause 2  and includes
23. Id. § 1362.
24. The right of confrontation was first made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment in 1965. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
25. In Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), the Court held that it was a violation of the
confrontation clause to prevent the defendant from asking the prosecutor's principal witness
his correct name and address. Forbidding such a rudimentary inquiry at the outset was held
to effectively emasculate the right of confrontation. In Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687
(1931), the Court held that prohibiting the defendant from establishing the federal authori-
ties' custody of the prosecution witness prevented the defendant from showing possible bias
and violated his right of confrontation. Significantly, in discussing the trial court's discretion
in limiting the extent of cross-examination, the Court recognized that the judge might exer-
cise discretion in determining when a subject is exhausted. It added, however, that there is
no obligation upon the trial judge to protect the witness from being discredited on cross-
examination, unless there is an attempted invasion of his constitutional protection against
self-incrimination or unless there are questions designed to merely harass, annoy or humiliate
the witness.
26. 415 U.S. at 318. The Alaska Supreme Court had found:
Counsel alluded both to possible ulterior motives of the child and to the possibility
that the child's identification arose from apprehension. . . . [T]he suggestion was
nonetheless brought to the attention of the jury, and that body was afforded the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the youth and pass on his credibility.
499 P.2d at 1036.
27. 415 U.S. at 318.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 315. In support of its reasoning, the Court cited Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965), where the Court held that cross-examination was not adequate where the defen-
dant was unable to cross-examine a witness convicted of the same crime who claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecutor was permitted, over defense counsel's
objection, to read to the jury the witness' confession implicating the defendant.
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the right to expose the motivation behind a witness' testimony, if
one exists."
Green's testimony was vital to the prosecution's case, and the
defendant sought to establish Green's possible prejudice or bias.
The Court found that Green's testimony could have been affected
by a fear that his probationary status was in jeopardy or a belief that
he might be implicated by the investigation.31 The facts of the sup-
posed bias were necessary to enable the jury to draw an appropri-
ate inference as to the reliability of the witness. Unable to effec-
tively cross-examine, Davis was denied the constitutionally pro-
tected right of confrontation, a right so fundamental that "no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. '32
Although the Court did not challenge the state's interest in pre-
serving the juvenile's anonymity, 3 it held the right of confrontation
paramount.3 Since the state could easily have protected the juve-
nile's record by not calling him as a witness, 5 the Court concluded
that the state's desire to permit Green to fulfill his duty to testify
freely and without exposing his juvenile record must bow to Davis'
right to seek the truth in his defense.3 ' The Court narrowly limited
the holding to apply only to cross-examination aimed at establish-
30. In support of its reasoning the Court quoted Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496
(1959):
[Disclosure of evidence to the individual is] even more important [in the case] where
the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty
or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice or jealousy."
415 U.S. at 317 n.4.
31. Green's probation had resulted from a juvenile court's conviction for burglary-the
same type of crime with which Davis was charged. Green's proximity to these events could
have implicated him in the burglary and consequently endangered his probation. 415 U.S.
at 311.
32. Id. at 318, citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1,
(1966) (denial of the right of effective cross-examination is a constitutional error which a
showing of a lack of prejudice will not cure).
33. 415 U.S. at 319, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (accused juvenile has the right
to counsel, to notice of the charges against him, to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination).
34. The Court stated that:
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's
record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness.
415 U.S. at 320.
35. Id.
36. Id., citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931).
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ing bias of the juvenile witness. Use of the record for general charac-
ter impeachment would not be allowed. 7
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized the
narrowness of the holding by cautioning that a right does not exist
in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness by
production of juvenile records on cross-examination. 8 Justice
White, dissenting,39 expressed the view that the case did not involve
a constitutional issue, but rather presented another instance in
which the trial court's discretion in limiting cross-examination
should not be disturbed."
ANALYSIS
It may appear that the Court's opinion did not adequately deal
with the policy of protecting the juvenile offender and in summary
fashion has eroded juvenile rights. The Court, however, did not
condone the revelation of juvenile records for either general charac-
ter impeachment or impeachment by showing a previous criminal
record. Thus, there was little danger of infringing upon the state
policy of protecting the juvenile from undue exposure and harass-
ment. Because the decision did not permit the needless exposure of
juvenile records merely for the purpose of harassment or general
character impeachment, the Court recognized the juvenile witness
would suffer no more than a "temporary embarrassment." 4'
Two other factors may have contributed to the Court's decision.
First, the Alaska statute itself prohibited the use of the record only
"against the minor in a subsequent case or proceeding in any other
court. '4 2 The juvenile here was not the defendant, but was only a
37. Bias is a specific form of impeachment showing the partiality of the witness by point-
ing out any acts, relationships, or motives that are likely to produce it. See 3A J. WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE §§ 943-69 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). Impeachment by general character testimony
is a much broader form of impeachment in which the witness' character for truthfulness is
relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the truth of his particular testimony. Id.
§§ 980, 980(a), 985-87.
38. 415 U.S. at 321.
39. Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice White's dissent.
40. 415 U.S. at 321. In view of the Court's recent decisions concerning the scope of the
right of confrontation, it appears that the dissent's position is weak. This reasoning has been
adequately dealt with in at least two opinions, Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), and
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931), where the Court held that constitutional issues
are raised when cross-examination is sufficiently impeded.
41. 415 U.S. at 319.
42. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) (emphasis added).
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witness. Having recognized the state's legitimate interest in protect-
ing juveniles, the Court can be seen as simply not broadening that
protection beyond the literal wording of the statute when there are
countervailing policies. Secondly, the state itself had the opportun-
ity to protect the juvenile by not putting him on the stand. In failing
to balance the policy of protecting him against the need to convict
those who are guilty, the state itself had already decided to place
the juvenile in jeopardy.
A survey of state decisions reveals that courts have not directly
dealt with the narrow issue of admitting juvenile records to show the
juvenile witness' possible bias. Alaska was the only state that pro-
hibited the disclosure of a juvenile record to show the possibility of
bias or prejudice of the juvenile witness. 3 Yet, those decisions avail-
able support the Court's reasoning in Davis and indicate that the
state's policy has not been seriously infringed. Even the decisions
which seem to deny the use of the record can be distinguished.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court made the strongest statement for
refusing to admit the juvenile's record for any reason." That court,
however, like many other state courts, 5 did not appear to have
considered the limited use of the juvenile record for the purpose of
showing the possibility of bias or prejudice on the part of the
juvenile witness.' Because the court did not address this question,
the decision, like similar decisions, is of limited precedential value
if the Court is correct that the juvenile will not be seriously harmed.
The Supreme Court of Maine held that the defendant's right of
confrontation was not denied by the trial court's exclusion of the
witness' juvenile record. 7 Although it did not allow the record itself
to be introduced," the trial court permitted evidence that the wit-
ness was in fact on juvenile probation, and that he had been alleg-
43. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507 (Supp. 1974).
44. Banas v. State, 34 Wisc. 2d 468, 473-74, 149 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1967).
45. For an overview of reactions by the state courts to attempts to expose the juvenile
record see 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 406 (1958). While this source is somewhat dated, diligent research
did not reveal a more current compendium of such cases.
46. While the Wisconsin court made a sweeping statement that the juvenile record could
not be disclosed in any other proceedings, there is no indication that the court anticipated
the limited use of the record to disclose the possibility of bias. Banas v. State, 34 Wisc. 2d
468, 473-74, 149 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1967).
47. State v. Carey, 290 A.2d 839 (Me. 1972).
48. It should be noted here that the Maine court made a distinction between the record
itself being admitted into evidence and informing the jury that the witness is in fact on
probation. While the Supreme Court makes no such distinction in Davis, it appears that the
1975
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edly threatened with probation revocation if he did not testify.49 It
was exactly this type of evidence concerning probation which was
permitted by the Supreme Court in Davis.
The Supreme Court of Illinois permitted disclosure of juvenile
records of the state's principal witness to show that his testimony
was attributable to lenient treatment he had received or had been
promised by the state. 50 The court held that it would be error to
restrict the defendant's efforts to impeach the witness when the
juvenile was the only witness who had implicated the defendant in
the crime.51 This case is significant in that it precisely parallels the
Davis case in two important respects. In both cases the juvenile
witness was the prosecution's principal witness, and both construed
statutes with similar wording.52 The Illinois Supreme Court found,
as did the Supreme Court in Davis, that the statute was not to be
construed as prohibiting the disclosure of the records of juvenile
delinquents when those records are sought to impeach the credibil-
ity of the juvenile witness by showing a possible motive for testifying
falsely. 3
CONCLUSION
Given the gradual expansion of the confrontation clause by the
Supreme Court, Davis can only be considered a logical outcome.
The holding neither overstepped precedent nor defeated state pol-
icy. The opinion is at least a partial answer to critics who assert that
many of the rights of the accused established by the Warren Court
have been substantially eroded by the Burger Court.5 4 While the
narrow scope of the holding should minimize its effect on states
Court would agree with the Maine court. That is, merely informing the jury that the witness
was on probation would satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.
49. 290 A.2d at 840.
50. People v. Norwood, 54 Ill. 2d 253, 296 N.E.2d 852 (1973).
51. Id. at 259, 296 N.E.2d at 855.
52. Compare ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) and ALAsKA R. Juv. P. 23 with this
portion of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-9 (Smith-Hurd 1972):
(1) No adjudication, disposition or evidence given in proceedings under this Act is
admissible as evidence against the minor for any purpose whatever in any civil, crimi-
nal or other cause or proceeding except in subsequent proceedings under this Act
concerning the same minor.
Id.
53. 54 IIl. 2d at 254, 296 N.E.2d at 854.
54. See, e.g., Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions In Criminal Justice, 60 GEo.
L.J. 249 (1971).
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which have juvenile statutes similar to Alaska's, the protection af-
forded the accused is immeasurable.
Frank A. Fisher, Jr.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-"PLAIN-MEANING RULE"-EQUAL PAY
LAw-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that an employer
is entitled, in order to comply with the Equal Pay Law as it read
prior to 1968, to lower the wage rates of male employees to a point
equal to those of female employees against whom it has discrimi-
nated. Although subsequent statutory amendments have rendered
the case moot substantively, the court's reliance upon the "plain-
meaning" rule of statutory construction remains significant.
Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., 226 Pa. Super. 342, 313 A.2d
276 (1973).
Rules of statutory interpretation have been developed throughout
our judicial history in recognition of the relationship between the
courts and the legislatures. The concept of separation of powers
limits the court's ability to "usurp" the power of the legislature by
disregarding or distorting the legislative intent expressed in statu-
tory enactments. The rules deal generally with the meaning of sta-
tutory language, the use of extrinsic materials as interpretive aids,
and the presumptions for ascertaining legislative intent.'
One often expressed rule relating to the use of extrinsic materials
to aid interpretation was announced by the United States Supreme
Court when it stated that the duty of interpretation does not arise
when the language admits of no more than one meaning.2 This ex-
pression of the so-called "plain-meaning" rule has been echoed in
different forms by courts throughout the United States3 and has
1. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 337 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Horack].
2. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "Where the language is plain and
admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
3. See, e.g., Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 294, 394 P.2d 410, 412 (1964) ("Where
the statute is unambiguous, the courts will only apply the language used and not interpret,
for the statute speaks for itself. "); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d
35, 41 (1968) ("If the words of a statute, given their normal meaning, are plain and sensible
the legislature will be presumed to have meant the meaning the words import."); Snow's
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